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  Contagion is greatly feared in today’s financial system.  The possibility that 
the collapse of a country’s banking system or equity market can set off an 
economic crisis is a grave concern for policy makers.  To find the appropriate 
safeguards and remedies, it is thus important to understand the underlying 
causes of contagion.  In this paper, we use a unique data set on individual 
depositors to examine the most traditional form of contagion, banking panics in 
mid-nineteenth century America, for evidence on which models best explain 
panics in an era of light regulation and no deposit insurance.   
In the large literature on banking panics (see Gorton and Winton, 2001), 
there are two general classes of models that have been used to explain why 
depositors panic.  Models following the seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) view bank runs as ignited by random events that induce each depositor to 
run because they believe that other depositors will run on the bank and force it 
into a costly liquidation.  The fear of being last, when depositors are served 
sequentially, drives the run.  Panics here are produced by the spread of runs 
from one bank to another.  Kauffman (1994) terms these panics, where a run on 
one bank spreads to otherwise sound banks to be the result of “non-
informational” contagion.   In contrast, models based on asymmetric information 
(Gorton, 1985; Chari and Jagannathan, 1988; Jacklin and Battacharya, 1988; 
Calomiris and Schweikart, 1991; and Calomiris and Gorton, 1992) see runs as 
beginning when some depositors observe negative information about the value of 
bank assets and withdraw their deposits.  Unable to perfectly discriminate 
between sound and unsound banks and observing a wave of withdrawals, other   3
depositors follow suit, leading to runs on multiple banks.
1  Given that panics of 
this character are initiated by identifiable shocks, Kauffman terms them 
“informational” contagion.   
Although there have been empirical studies of nineteenth century 
American panics, these focus at the aggregate level on the number of bank 
closings and they find some support for both models.  We use the records of 
individual depositors of the Emigrant Savings Industrial Bank (EISB), which was 
subject to serious runs in 1854 and 1857, to examine the causes of banking 
panics using a hazard model.  These two episodes provide a natural experiment, 
as the panics were the results of different shocks.  The panic of 1854 was local 
and started with the news of a single bank’s insolvency, while the panic of 1857 
was brought about by a system-wide shock that affected the whole financial 
sector.  The microeconomic evidence reveals that the runs on the EISB do not fit 
a simple stylized picture.   
In neither 1854 nor 1857 did depositors respond to a signal which led 
them to crowd into banks all at once. Instead, panics lasted a few weeks building 
and sometimes ebbing in intensity, and only a fraction of all accounts were 
closed.  Our survival analysis of the accounts supports savvy contemporaries’ 
observations.  The run on the EISB during the panic of 1854 was by 
predominantly less wealthy, less experienced, and less sophisticated—
“uninformed”---depositors.  The “random” event of another savings bank failure 
ignites runs on the EISB and other savings banks even though there was no 
                                                       
1 Calomiris and Kahn (1991) see panics as a monitoring device where depositors are induced to 
engage in costly monitoring.  The sequential payment of depositors at the window serves as a   4
evidence that they were insolvent.  In earlier work, Kelly and Ó Gráda (2000) 
have shown that the run followed networks within the Irish community, providing 
a test of social contagion.   As such, the 1854 run followed the pattern described 
by Diamond and Dybvig.  However, the banks were not overwhelmed, and by 
steadfastly paying their customers, the panic died away.   In contrast, the panic 
of 1857 began as a run by the more wealthy experienced and sophisticated 
depositors---the “informed”---who observed the declining value of many bank 
portfolios, and then ran.  Watching these depositors, others eventually joined 
them at the tellers’ windows, making 1857 look more like a panic generated by 
asymmetric information.   The banking system was overwhelmed and only a 
general suspension of payments prevented a total collapse.   Overall, while there 
is evidence for pure contagion a la Diamond-Dybvig, the general shock in the 
presence of informational asymmetries appears to be of more importance 
because of its severity. 
 
1. Banking Panics in Nineteenth Century America 
  The nineteenth and early twentieth century American banking system was 
subject to banking panics that led first to the creation of the Federal Reserve 
System in 1913 and later to the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation in 1933.  However, while panics may have troubled the public and 
policy makers, the definition of what constitutes a panic remained fluid.  Often the 
term banking panic has been used to identify an event where banks fail in the 
midst of a recession or stock market crash.  The result has been substantial 
                                                                                                                                                              
constraint that efficiently rewards those who arrive and withdraw their funds first.   5
differences in the number of panics, as counted by different authors.  Looking at 
the period 1890 – 1910, Sprague (1910) emphasized three crises (1890, 1893 
and 1907) while his contemporary Kemmerer (1910) found six major panics 
(1890, 1893, 1899, 1901, 1903, and 1907) plus fifteen minor panics.  Modern 
authors (e.g. Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Miron, 1986) also differ on what 
episodes constituted banking panics. 
  Calomiris and Gorton (1991) have defined a banking panic as an event 
involving a significant number of banks are involved.   A run on a single bank 
does not constitute a panic, though a panic may involve some but not all banks in 
the system.   Furthermore, depositors must suddenly demand redemption for 
cash, so protracted withdrawals are ruled out.   The volume of desired 
redemptions must be sufficiently large to require banks to suspend convertibility 
or act collectively to avoid suspension at the rate of one dollar of debt for one 
dollar of cash.  In the case of the latter, late nineteenth clearing houses acted to 
increased liquidity by accepting member bank assets and issuing clearing house 
loan certificates. Table 1 reports Calomiris and Gorton’s list of banking panics 
that conform to their definition.  During the National Banking Era 1864-1914, 
there were four widespread suspensions of convertibility (1873, 1893, 1907, 
1914) and six times when clearing houses issued loan certificates (1873, 1884, 
1890, 1893, 1907, and 1914).   By their definition, one event we consider, 1857, 
is a panic, but 1854 is not because it was a local New York phenomenon.     
Nevertheless, it is valuable to examine 1854 is well worth examing because it   6
meets their definition at the local level with  many banks experiencing rapid 



















Source: Calomiris and Gorton (1991).  For the late nineteenth century, Sprague (1910) identified 
August 1890, May 1893 and October 1907 as panics.  Kemmerer (1910) declared that major 
panics occurred in September 1890, May 1893, December 1899, May 1901, March 1903, and 
October 1907 with an additional 15 panics between 1893 and 1908. 
 
Disagreeing about the definition of panics, researchers have also argued 
about the origins of panics.  It has long been noted that panics tended to occur at 
times when the agricultural sector’s demand for money was at a peak in spring 
and especially autumn.  The stress this imposed on the banking system is 
generally regarded to have been amplified by the structure of reserve 
requirements under the National Banking System and later the Federal Reserve, 
and the pre-Fed inelastic supply of banknotes.  Thus, Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963), Miron (1986), and others have argued that panics arose when a shock hit 
an already seasonally tight money market.     7
In the search for some shift in the economy that could induce panics, Gorton 
(1988) regressed the deposit to currency ratio on the interest rate and other 
panic indicator variables and found that there was no structure change in the 
relationship between panic and non-panic periods.  He concluded that bank runs 
were “systematic” events triggered by changing views of deposit risk rather than 
by special events attendant to each panic.  Surveying the effects of 
macroeconomic variables on panics, Calomiris and Gorton (1991) concluded that 
general macroeconomic disturbances were responsible. They found that during 
the National Banking era panics occurred when depositors realized that there 
had been an adverse shock but did not know the precise extent or incidence of 
the shock among banks.  In contrast Donaldson (1992) looked at the interest rate 
as an indicator of panic and in weekly data found panic period behavior was 
different from non-panic periods.  Unable to predict the exact panic dates, 
Donaldson concluded that panics were random draws from a set of possible 
events, as suggested by the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model.   In contrast to 
these studies,  this paper finds evidence for both models of panics in the 
behavior of the depositors of the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank. 
 
2. The Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank 
  Formed to promote thrift among Irish immigrants, the Emigrant Industrial 
Savings Bank was chartered as a mutual savings bank in April 1850. The EISB 
was an outgrowth of the Irish Emigrant Society, which had been founded by Irish 
immigrants in 1840 and had built up a considerable bill business in sending   8
emigrant remittances back to Ireland during the 1840s.  The bank began to 
accept deposits at its offices on Chambers Street in Manhattan on September 
30, 1850.  
The EISB was the eighth mutual savings bank in New York to be 
chartered.   The first, the Bank for Savings, was established in 1819.   The 1850s 
was a period of fairly rapid bank formation, and another eleven savings banks 
were chartered during the decade (Olmstead, 1976). The rapid growth of the 
EISB’s and New York City mutual savings banks’ accounts and deposits are 
shown in Table 2.  However, the leading depository institutions were the 
commercial banks.  In 1856, there were 56 commercial banks in New York City.   
Their individual deposits totalled $66.1 million, and they had issued $8.2 million 
in banknotes and held another $20.3 million in deposits of other banks (New York 
State, Assembly Document No. 5, 1858). In the same year, the sixteen savings 
banks had 132,917 accounts with $28.2 million.   Although the savings banks 
were smaller, their depositors were more representative of the general population 
of the city, as commercial banks catered primarily to the business community in 
this period. 
The EISB’s 4,291 accounts containing $1 million in deposits made it the 
seventh largest savings bank in 1856.  There were also 23 commercial banks 
with individual deposits that exceeded the holdings at the EISB.  Thus, the EISB 
was a mid-sized institution. It was one of the most accessible savings banks in 
New York City in the 1850s, open 42 hours per week when some savings banks 
offered only 6 hours (Olmstead, 1976). The size of the EISB’s accounts was fairly   9
typical of savings banks. In 1855, the average deposit account at the EISB had 
$224, while the Bowery Savings Bank had $212, the Greenwich Savings Bank 
$280, the Bank for Savings $164, and the Seaman’s Savings Bank, $313.  The 
average for all American savings banks was $196 (Olmstead, 1976).  Savings 
banks tended to discourage large accounts through discriminatory interest rate 
policies.  Thus the EISB paid 6 percent on accounts under $500 and 5 percent 
on accounts over $500.
2  Nevertheless, the bank had many prosperous clients 
whose accounts exceeded $500. Some depositors held multiple accounts in one 
or more banks to gain higher interest.
3 Quite apart from philanthropic bias toward 
small savers, bank trustees harbored a distrust of their more prosperous 
customers, whom they associated with pressure to make risky investments and 
with making heavy withdrawals during panics.  Evidence of such behavior was 
given by the president of the Bank for Savings, Philip Hone whose numbers 
imply that the average size of withdrawals greatly exceeded the average balance 












                                                       
2More established mutual savings banks tended to offer  5 percent up to a maximum balance of 
$500 or $1000 and 4 percent thereafter, while newer ones followed the EISB’s pattern of 5 and 6 
percent (Olmstead, 1976, p. 37-8).  
3 New York Herald (October 14, 1857).  “Bustling in came a square-built Dutch woman, puffing 
and blowing with apprehension, and holding in her hand ten account books, each for $499.   10
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1851 265  34,899  79,325  17.0 
1852 1,098  186,313  88,893  19.6 
1853 2,183  455,310  98,131  22.1 
1854 3,661  813,996  118,362  26.2 
1855 3,691  822,453  122,453  26.2 
1856 4,291  1,001,233 132,917  28.2 
1857 5,461  1,302,791 151,510  32.6 
1858 5,698  1,348,730 154,569  32.8 
1859 5,586  1,628,755 170,433  37.0 
1860 8,487  2,172,873 196,079  43.7 
1861 10,096  2,627,542 216,755  49.2 
Source: Olmstead (1976), p. 159 and 182. 
 
 
The average deposit of $224 in 1855 represented a substantial 
accumulation.  Goldin and Margo (1992) study of wages paid to civilians by the 
U.S. Army is the most comprehensive source of information of wages in the mid-
nineteenth century.  They found that the average daily wage for laborers was 
$1.08, while artisans were paid $1.43 and clerks $2.35. Wages seem to have 
been little different in New York City in 1850.   Lebergott (1964) reported that 
unskilled workers received $0.90 per day, carpenters $1.38, and female 
domestics $1.05 in addition to room and board.   While depositors held a 
significant fraction of annual income in their accounts, not all were accumulating 
nest eggs.  In about one-third of accounts opened in the bank’s early years the 
last withdrawal was smaller than the original deposit, while in another tenth or so 
the sum withdrawn was the same as that deposited.   Most accounts were held   11
for a year or two, though some customers who closed their accounts re-opened 
them later.  The pattern of EISB account holder behavior replicates Alter, Goldin, 
and Rotella’s finding's for accounts opened at the Philadelphia Saving Fund 
Society in 1850 as “relatively large in size, brief in duration, and inactive” (Alter, 
Goldin, and Rotella, 1994, p. 764). 
Dividends—interest on accounts—were credited and compounded on 
January 1 and July 1, although they were not paid until the middle of the month.  
Deposits of less than $5 received no interest nor did fractions of a dollar.  Six 
months’ interest was paid on all funds deposited six months prior to January 1 or 
July 1, and three months’ interest was paid on all sums deposited after January 1 
or July 1 and before October 1 or April 1.   In response, deposits in savings 
banks peaked in March, June, September, and December and were low in 
January and July (Olmstead, 1976). 
 
Table 3 


















1854 853  39  4.6 
1855 844  22  2.6 
1856 1,039  38  3.7 
1857 1,371  69  5.0 
1858 1,409  61  4.3 
1859 1,696  67  4.0 
1860 2,202  30  1.4 
1861 2,658  30  1.1 
Source:  see text. 
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Although its origins were philanthropic, the bank conducted its lending in a 
business-like manner.   Its charter limited its investments to invest in state and 
municipal bonds, call loans and mortgages.   Mortgage loans were permitted for 
a maximum of half the value of the collateral.  The interest rate on its mortgages 
was 7 percent, a limit set by the state usury law.    In 1853, New York granted 
savings banks the power to make call loans, loans to brokers collateralized by 
stocks and bonds (Olmstead, 1976).  The EISB was the first mutual savings bank 
to be granted this power in its charter in 1850, and it was a regular lender to 
brokers.
4   The bank kept relatively little cash on hand in the 1850s.  In the crisis 
in 1857, the bank held approximately 2.5 percent of its assets in cash.   
Afterwards, it tended to keep 5 percent in cash, reaching 7 percent when the Civil 
War neared.  The EISB preferred to maintain its liquidity with its loans on call 
(briefly mixed in 1860-1861 with U.S. securities) that averaged about 15 percent 
of its portfolio.   For most of this period, it held very little cash was on hand, 
relying instead on liquid funds held in commercial banks for safekeeping, where 
they earned interest.   
Most mutual savings banks began with little capital.  The trustees, keenly 
aware of the need to build up capital to protect depositors achieved this through 
the surplus funds.  However, the state legislature apparently regarded the 
accumulation of surplus funds by mutuals with suspicion.  When Albany 
threatened to confiscate their surplus funds, some savings banks sent lobbyists 
to defeat the proposals (Olmstead, 1976).  This threat may thus have kept capital 
                                                       
4Older mutual savings banks, including the Bank for Savings, Seaman’s, Greenwich, and Bowery 
were not active in this market (Olmstead, 1976, pp. 138-9).    13
lower than trustees may have desired.  Table 3 shows the total assets, surplus 
and capital to asset ratio for the EISB.
5   The last column suggests that the bank 
built up capital during stable periods, only to see it drop in financial crises.   
 
3. The Panic of 1854 
The panic of 1854 began with news of the failure of the Knickerbocker 
Savings Bank, which sparked a run on the other savings banks in the city.  The 
Knickerbocker’s demise was due to the failure of the bank of issue of the same 
name, with which it was closely linked and where a quarter of its deposits were 
held.  It was the only savings bank to fail in the antebellum era.  When its affairs 
were finally wound up, the bank paid its depositors 86.5 percent on the dollar 
(Olmstead, 1976, p. 142). Other savings banks and banks in the city were 
solvent and did not fail during or immediately after the panic.   
The Knickerbocker Savings Bank was apparently manipulated by its 
trustees who were also directors of the Knickerbocker Bank. The savings banks’ 
portfolio was surprisingly weak.  The real estate securing its mortgages were 
overvalued, and notes held by the savings bank and collateralized by the stock of 
the commercial bank were almost a total loss.  Little wonder that a report by 
special investigator Emerson W. Keyes found that the Knickerbocker “was in fact 
little more than a side issue of the bank of discount” (cited in Olmstead, 1976: 
142-3).    
The run started on 12 December 1854 on the news that the Knickerbocker 
                                                       
5 Surplus is imputed as the difference between total assets and total deposits, and the capital to 
asset ratio is the ratio of surplus to total assets.  The EISB Finance Committee records provided   14
Bank had not produced a weekly statement for the New York Clearing House.  
On the 13th several of the savings banks were forced to pay out “freely”, and on 
the following day the Bank for Savings sent $200,000 of their government paper 
to Washington for redemption.  The news reduced the demand for deposits, and 
the Tribune confidently predicted that “a week’s experience” would satisfy even 
the most gullible account holders that all was well with the savings banks.  On 
Monday December 18, the same paper reported that the “senseless” run on the 
savings banks had “measurably subsided”, and that “a few days will probably see 
the end of it.” 
The consensus in the press was that the banks were solvent and the run 
on the savings banks was by uninformed depositors.  The city’s newspapers 
were unanimous in denouncing the folly of those participating in the run, and 
repeatedly urged that the other savings banks were sound.  The New York Post 
deemed the run on the Bank for Savings “one of the most senseless on record” 
and reminded those contemplating withdrawal that they stood to lose the half-
year’s interest they would earn if they waited until the end of the month.  The 
Tribune explained that “most of the depositors in these institutions [were] easily 
excited by rumors, and incapable of discriminating between a perfectly safe 
institution like the Chambers Street, Bowery, Greenwich, etc. and such bogus 
affairs as the Eighth Avenue concern.”  The Tribune declared that the Bank for 
Savings had assets of the “highest character” and mortgages “on the choicest 
property in this city.”  The Times predicted that the run, which “could have 
scarcely have been more uselessly directed so far as savings depositors are 
                                                                                                                                                              
the data on assets and Olmstead (1976) the information on deposits.   15
concerned ... will soon expend itself.”
6 
The Emigrant was not mentioned in these accounts, but it certainly was not 
immune from the panic.  Between December 11 and December 30, 234 account 
holders (about 7 percent of all account holders) closed their accounts.  No 
developments specific to the EISB could have provoked the increased closure of 
accounts.  There was no change in the real estate market, and the EISB’s 
mortgages were well collateralized.   The only likely source of a shock would 
have been from the bond market, as about 25 percent of its assets were held in 
state and municipal bonds.  Yet, there was little change in the relevant bond 
prices between September and December 1854.  Prices of New York municipals, 











                                                       
6 A run on the Savings Bank of Baltimore was similarly described as the product of “mischevious 
rumors” among depositors that the bank had speculated in Baltimore and Ohio Railroad stock.  
Depositors withdrew $160,000 and sold savings books at discount.  The run abated when wealthy 















1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863
Opened Closed
Source: EISB Finance Committee minutes. 
 
 
As seen in Table 2, the panic appears to have slowed down the bank’s rapid 
growth since its founding in 1851.  The number of accounts and the total deposits 
are scarcely higher at the end of 1855 than a year earlier.   A more detailed view 
of how the panic affected the bank can be seen in Figures 1 to 3. Besides 
highlighting the early growth of the EISB and the crises that beset it, they show a 
high degree of seasonality in the bank’s business.  For example, drafts were   17
subject to much more seasonality than deposits, with two major peaks in January 
and July.  The striking bi-annual peaks in withdrawals are a reflection of a form of 
“coupon-clipping”: a significant number of depositors regularly withdrew interest 
payments due without touching the principal. 
Figure 2 









1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863
deposits drafts
Source: EISB Finance Committee minutes 
 
Figure 1 shows the monthly number of accounts opened and closed between 
1851 and 1863.
7   The panic of December 1854 stands out clearly in terms of the 
number of accounts closed.  Figure 2 displays the number of deposits made and 
                                                       
7 As is evident in Figures 1, 2, and 3, there was another panic in 1861.  However, we do not 
analyze it, owing the absence of the requisite deposit records.   18
the number of drafts made on the bank.  In December the number of drafts rose 
to a new peak of 868.  The spike seems to reflect the fact that some depositors 
did not empty their accounts but chose to lower their balances.   The net loss of 
funds in Figure 3 was $25,000 for December, a notable decline in a month when 
the bank ordinarily gained funds.  The usual post-dividend payment decline in 
January and February brought the total net loss to $39,000 or about 5 percent of 
its deposits.  
Figure 3 
Dollar Inflows and Outflows 
1851-1863 








1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863
dollars inflows dollars outflows
 
Source: EISB Finance Committee minutes. 
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4. The Panic of 1857 
 
Although the panic of 1857 was precipitated by the failure of the Ohio Life and 
Trust Company, the proximate cause of the panic was the collapse of the market 
for speculative western land and railroad securities.  This collapse was linked to 
the political uncertainty over whether Kansas and Nebraska would become slave 
states  (Calomiris and Schweikart, 1991). The uncertainty hurt the new Western 
railroads, which connected eastern markets with new areas of settlement.   In the 
spring of 1857, railroads were market favorites; but by late summer, prices fell, 
devastating institutions like Ohio Life. 
Closed on August 24, Ohio Life was not an insurance company but a large 
bank, whose New York branch took deposits and made margin loans.  As the 
transfer agent for the state of Ohio, it was a major financial institution in that state 
(Van Vleck, 1943).   Moreover, few New York banks could match Ohio Life's 
capital of $2 million.  Its failure prompted a drop in the stock market and a 
tightening of credit by the banks in New York and other Eastern cities.  The 
reduction of bank loans to brokers and dealers forced some into bankruptcy, 
dumping more securities on the market.  At the same time, the rise in bank risk 
prompted some noteholders and depositors in New York State to convert their 
bank notes and deposits into specie. Country banks began to demand 
redemption from city banks.  Finding their gold reserves in decline, the city banks 
refused to rollover brokers’ debts, forcing more into bankruptcy, depressing bond 
prices further.     20
Between August 22 and September 26, the Clearing House banks---almost all 
commercial banks in New York City---saw their deposits fall from $64.2 to $56.9 
million and their banknotes from $8.7 to $7.8 million.
8  Although their specie 
dipped temporarily in the interim, it rose from $10.1 to $13.3 million, managed 
largely by the contraction of loans from $120.1 to $107.8 million (Van Vleck, 
1943).   While a seasonal contraction was typical, these events in 1857 were 
more severe (Temin, 1975). Initially, the public retained some confidence in New 
York banks, but it was waning elsewhere.  Widespread rejection of notes by 
banks created a demand for specie.  The panic began when a run on the banks 
in Philadelphia led to a partial suspension of specie payments on September 25 
and a complete suspension on September 26. Bank runs in Chicago and 
elsewhere followed.  
No sooner did news of the suspension in Philadelphia arrived in New York 
than depositors began to withdraw deposits.  Thus, the New York panic was 
initiated on September 26.  Attempting to stem the tide of withdrawals, thirteen 
New York bank presidents declared that they would not suspend on September 
28.  But the public turned a deaf ear to their statement.   Banks around the 
country began to suspend, drawing down deposits in New York.  On October 9, 
there were heavy runs on several banks.  Deposits in New York banks fell to 
$49.7 million and specie dropped to $11.5 million.  On the same day the Erie, 
Michigan Central, and Illinois Central railroad failed to meet their obligations.     
Bank runs continued to drain specie, forcing all banks except the Chemical Bank 
                                                       
8 The New York Clearing House began operation on October 11, 1853 with 51 member banks 
(Cannon, 1910).   21
to suspend payments on October 14.  By that evening of October 14, banks 
throughout the country had suspended (Van Vleck, 1943).  Deposits and specie 
were at their nadir of $42.7 million and $7.8 million at the end of the week, 
October 17.  The markets began a quick recovery after the suspension, with 
stock prices rising quickly. Specie payment was resumed two months later on 
December 14. 
According to the newspapers, the panic began with businessmen running on 
the banks, suggesting that runs were initiated by more informed depositors.  The 
New York Herald (October 11 and 13, 1857) declared that “the laboring classes 
have shown their wisdom in not being needlessly frightened and the savings 
institutions have not been compelled to meet any extraordinary demand from 
their depositors.”  Early on only the Bowery Savings Bank was hit with a run the 
day after the Bowery Bank failed---many depositors “supposed the Bowery Bank 
was the Bowery Savings Bank, altogether two entirely distinct establishments.”  
As the panic spread, there were runs on other savings banks, and the 
newspapers implied that the less informed laboring classes led these runs.   The 
offices were jammed full with people, waiting the whole day as clerks attempted 
to meet the demand for withdrawals.  
The savings banks, and perhaps the EISB in particular received support from 
the Catholic Church. Priests reassured their congregations by example.  In the 
sample described in the next section, there was one bishop and twenty-six 
priests with accounts in the bank at the beginning of October 1857.  Only six 
priests closed their accounts, but they resided upstate, on Long Island, in New   22
Jersey and one in Brooklyn.  Their accounts were relatively modest, suggesting 
most were personal funds. The Irish American (October 17, 1857) stated “We 
understand that in some of the Catholic churches in Brooklyn on Sunday last, the 
pastors assured such of their flocks as had deposits in Savings Banks that they 
need not be alarmed about them, as these institutions were perfectly safe.”  And 
the paper then commented: “These institutions are conducted on principles 
entirely different from those of banks of issue.  The capital of the New York 
Savings Banks is generally invested at interest in State and United States stocks, 
and mortgages on improved real estate, well secured, and can always be 
realized dollar for dollar, provided no extraordinary demands are made on the 
Banks by depositors.” 
Figure 1 shows the October 1857 spike in closed accounts that reached 635, 
representing twelve percent of the approximately 5400 accounts.  The number of 
new accounts opened also fell in October and November.   In Figure 2, the 
number of drafts rose to 1733, peaking again in January 1858.  Meanwhile the 
number of deposits made fell below 500.   Similarly, dollar outflows in Figure 3 
reached a new peak of $168,000 in October 1857, with deposit inflows remaining 
very low for two months.  The net outflow of funds from September to November 
totaled $144,000, or over 10 percent of total deposits.    
Was the solvency of the EISB in question in 1857?  Over 35 percent of the 
bank's portfolio were mortgages on New York, mostly New York City, real estate.  
As the crisis of 1857 did not concern New York real estate values, these assets 
were presumably not in question, especially given that maximum mortgage was   23
only half the value of the property.  Between 40 and 45 percent of the bank’s 
portfolio was in state and municipal bonds.  In June 1857, the bank held 
$647,000 in bonds, of which $364,000 were New York City, Rochester and Troy 
bonds.  The remaining, $283,000 were bonds of Missouri, Tennessee, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, Kentucky, and Georgia (EISB, Finance Committee).     
The bank held no railroad bonds, where the fall in prices was most dramatic.   
Valuing the bond portfolio of the EISB is difficult because the securities market 
was quite thin.  Some bonds, like New York municipals, were not traded for 
months at a time.   Furthermore, there is no information on the prices at which 
bonds were acquired.  Nevertheless, it appears that the value of the EISB 
portfolio fell considerably.    Between August 3 and October 12/13, just before the 
banking suspension, its value of the portfolio decreased somewhere by between 
11 and 14 percent.
9   However, the suspension of payments by the commercial 
banks on October 14 not only halted the banking panic, it also buoyed the 
market.   Between October 12/14 and the end of the month, the value of the 
bank’s portfolio increased by somewhere between 3 and 7 percent.   By the end 
of November it was up 5 to 16 percent. 
As seen in Table 3, the EISB had a surplus of $69,000 and could have 
sustained a 5 percent decline in the value of its assets.  The main cause of 
concern were not the mortgages where there was no immediate changes, but in 
the bond market.  Given that the bond portfolio had a book value of  $694,000, 
an 11 to 14 percent decline in its value would have just wiped out the bank’s 
                                                       
9 If all New York municipals as much as New York City bonds, the change is 11 percent.  If they 
fell as much as New York State bonds, the decline was 14 percent.  The New York Times and the   24
capital.   It is highly unlikely that the public knew the exact composition of the 
EISB’s assets, much less its bond portfolio, but lacking this specific information 
the size of the drop in the market did in fact threaten the bank.   With asymmetric 
information, depositors could have reasonably run on the panic in the days 
before the October 14 suspension, even though its position was quickly improved 
afterwards.   The collapse did some damage to the capital accounts as New York 
State and City bonds were sold between the end of September and October, 
presumably with some loss as reflected in Table 3.  
To manage the contraction of deposits, the Finance Committee of the bank 
cut the bank’s call loans.  The margin on these loans was usually 20 percent and 
sometimes not even 10 percent, a danger in a volatile market.  Just before the 
onset of the run, EISB president Robert Dillon obtained a unanimous resolution 
from the Finance Committee that: 
In view of the probability that the drafts upon the bank will exceed 
the amount of deposits to the full sum of the stock loans. Resolved: 
The Comptroller is directed in all cases of such loans upon which 
there is now a margin to demand payment, this day, of the amount 
due and not paid tomorrow, that he sell the securities the next day 
(EISB, Finance Committee, Minutes, October 12, 1857). 
  
Call loans that had stood at a high of $281,000 in July 1857, drifting down to 
$237,000 by September were slashed to $150,000 in October.  The net 
withdrawal of $111,000 in October was covered by the demand of repayment of 
$87,000 of call loans, a drop in cash of $13,000 and the sale of some bonds. 
The 1857 crisis had a different character than the panic of 1854.  A 
nationwide, rather than a local panic, it imparted a shock to the whole financial 
                                                                                                                                                              
New York Herald  provided the prices from the stock exchange and private auctions.   25
system.  Banks holding investments directly in the affected investments or having 
given credit to investors in securities would have experienced a sharp decline in 
their net worth, prompting runs.  The better-informed depositors were alarmed by 
events in Philadelphia and elsewhere.  In contemporary accounts, they began to 
withdraw their deposits before  less informed bank customers. 
 
5.  Individual Behavior during Banking Panics 
The records of the EISB’s depositors present an embarrassment of riches.  
Already in early 1854, over 6,000 accounts had been opened, and by the 
beginning of 1857, an additional 7,000 accounts had been created.  The bank’s 
massive account ledgers have preserved every transaction: every deposit, 
dividend and withdrawal. The EISB's test books contain the names, addresses, 
and occupations of account holders.  Usually, they also provide data on 
nationality, spouses and children, relatives abroad, and the date of arrival in New 
York.  Written down in the sometimes clear and sometimes unclear hand of the 
clerks, these two sources yield a profile of each account holder. 
  These data provide a unique opportunity to study individual behavior during 
banking panics.  They also present a challenge in the identification of panic 
behavior. The traditional image of a banking run is of a long line of all customers 
waiting impatiently to close their accounts.    Yet, the runs on the EISB during the 
panics of 1854 and 1857 do not conform to this standard picture.  Although they 
generated lines of anxious depositors, not all accounts were closed.   
Furthermore, it appears that the funds flowed out of the bank by an increased   26
number of drafts, suggesting that some individuals drew down on their accounts 
but did not close them.  In December 1854, drafts rise but they do not peak as do 
account closings; the seasonal withdrawal peaks of July 1854 and January 1855 
are higher.   In the October 1857 panic, the peak in drafts is higher than July 
1857, but it is at the same level as the following January.    
While they may not be a perfect measure of a run, closed accounts 
appear to capture much of the panicking activity.   In December 1854, the total 
gross outflow of funds totaled $58,000.   The 325 account closings had an 
average final balance of $127, implying that they produced an outflow of 
$41,275.   For October 1857, the 635 closing accounts had an average final 
balance of $168, thus accounting for $106,680 of the $169,000 outflow from the 
bank.  Similarly in April 1861, closings appear to account for $104,100 of the 
$179,000 of outflow.
10   
An econometric analysis of the outflow of funds confirms the importance of 
account closings.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests on closings (CL), 
drafts (DR), and outflows (OUT) indicated that these variables were difference 
but not level stationary.
11   The variables were first differenced and outflows was 
regressed on closings and drafts with an AR(6) to account for the seasonality: 
 
(1)        D(OUT) = -0.217 + 0.114D(CL) + 0.065D(DR) + 0.171AR(6) 
         (-0.15)    (6.67)            (15.1)              (1.96) 
 
                                                       
10 In the absence of data on deposit accounts for 1861, the estimated outflow was found by using 
the average of the last balance for 1854 and 1857, although this is probably an underestimate 
given the growth in the size of accounts.   27
where the adjusted R-squared was 0.865.   On average, for the whole period, 
each individual closing caused an outflow of $114, while each draft averaged 
$65.  The coefficient on drafts is more tightly estimated, as the series is less 
volatile, as seen in Figures 1 and 2.  In ordinary times, the greater swings in 
drafts compared to closings led them to account for about half of the changes in 
outflows.  However, in crisis times, the volume of closings dominated, and as 
seen in the evidence about for the panic months, closings accounted for close to 
70 percent of the outflows of funds. 
To examine who panicked we analyze closed accounts during the panics of 
1854 and 1857, using the data from the account ledgers and test books to 
construct profiles of the depositors.  Depositors opened accounts for a variety of 
motives, with the period of holding an account open varying considerably from a 
month to many years.  Closure of an account during a panic represented an 
abnormally early termination.  We use survival analysis to examine the factors 
determining the closure of an account.  To capture panic behavior, we have 
drawn information on the accounts closed during the panics of 1854 and 1857.  
The panic of 1854 is defined as having occurred between December 11 and 30.  
During this time, 240 accounts were closed. Our data includes the 218 panic 
closures for which there was complete data in 1854. Similarly we have 337 panic 
closures in 1857, where the panic of 1857 is defined as having happened 
between September 28 and October 13. Our control groups consist of a sample 
of 485 accounts opened before 1854 and 404 accounts opened after 1856. 
                                                                                                                                                              
11 The ADF tests on twelve lags for the levels of closings, drafts and outflows were –2.19, -1.07,  -
1.32 and for first differences were -4.30, -4.00, -4.18, where the hypothesis of a unit root being   28
Obviously some accounts would have been closed during these periods even if 
there had not been a panic, however the number of closures was abnormally 
high.  To identify the characteristics of individuals who panicked—that is closed 
their accounts—between these dates, we have collected data on depositors for 
two control groups.  The first is a one-in-ten sample of all accounts opened from 
the date of the creation of the bank in 1850 to December 31, 1854.   It includes 
individuals who closed their accounts before the panic and afterwards to capture 
“ordinary,” non-panic behavior.  The second control group includes similar 
depositors who opened their accounts in 1856 and 1857.  Our sample appears to 
capture the diversity of account behavior, including representative short- and 
long-lived accounts. 
Table 4 provides a summary of most of the basic characteristics of “panicked” 
depositors and the control groups.  For 1854, the share of men and women in 
both groups is similar, but in 1857, the proportions of men and women panicking 
differed substantially, with far more women closing their accounts.  Married 
individuals and people with one or more children seem to have been at a slightly 
higher risk of panic. 
We used a three-way occupational classification of unskilled workers, semi-
skilled workers, and professionals.  The first and last categories were tightly 
defined.  Individuals identified as unskilled were domestics, servants, laborers, 
washerwomen, drivers, porters, factory worker, seamstresses, cartmen, and 
waiters.  The two occupations that dominated this category were laborers and 
domestics.  Professionals were gentlemen, land agents, saloonkeepers, lawyers, 
                                                                                                                                                              
rejected at the 1 percent level had a critical value of –3.47.   29
piano makers, physicians, and bookkeepers, with priests, teachers and 






















Total  218  485   337  404  
           
Men  151  69.3  360  74.2  194  57.6  289  71.5 
Women  67  30.7  125  25.8  143  42.4  115  28.5 
Married  125  57.3  233  48.0  168  49.9  197  48.8 
Joint Accounts  37  17.0  83  17.1  103  30.6  85  21.0 
One Child or More  94  43.1  172  35.5  138  40.9  142  35.1 
                 
Unskilled  131  60.1  195  40.2  234  69.4  225  55.7 
Semi-Skilled  62  28.4  175  36.1  72  21.4  126  31.2 
Professional  5  2.3  50  10.3  21  6.2  42  10.4 
                 
North America  8  3.7 37 7.6 13 3.9 25 6.2 
Great Britain  8  3.7 30 6.2 15 4.5 23 5.7 
Europe  14 6.4 48 9.9 27 8.0 33 8.2 
Ireland  187 85.8 360 74.2 283 84.0 310 76.7 
    Ulster  32 14.7  101  20.8 41 12.2 83 20.5 
    Munster  77  35.3 109 22.5 115 34.1 101 25.0 
    Leinster  45 20.6 93 19.2 73 21.7 72 17.8 
    Connacht  32 14.7 41  8.5  43 12.8 40  9.9 
Av. Years in Us if Foreign  5.08  2.3  6.15  1.3  5.73  1.7  8.58  2.1 
                 
Lower Manhattan  142  65.1  301  62.1  220  65.3  230  56.9 
Midtown  21  9.6  34  7.0  21  6.2  35  8.7 
Uptown  11  5.0  26  5.4  18  5.3  31  7.7 
Brooklyn & Staten Island  22  10.1  48  9.9  29  8.6  36  8.9 
NJ, CT and Upstate  24  11.0  44  9.1  45  13.4  57  14.1 
           
Mean First Deposit $  105 126 120 168  124 160 159 343 
Mean Days Open  293 215  1155  1524  273 239  1432  1541 
Mean Deposits  3.0 3.1 4.6 6.6  2.8 3.5 5.4 8.2 
Mean Withdrawals  2.7 2.4 5.7 5.7  2.4 4.0 5.5 6.4 
Mean Closing Balance $  121 117 174 270  160 170 189 239 
Mean Cumulative Deposits $   162 160 310 457  202 284 367 623 
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middle category embraced smiths, coopers, mechanics, farmers, tailors, 
ironworkers, masons and clerks.  Although a washerwoman or porter might have 
eavesdropped on a knowledgeable employer, we consider that the more skilled 
the worker, the more likely he or she would be informed of the banking situation 
and the less likely to panic. For both men and women, unskilled workers 
represented a much higher proportion of depositors closing accounts in the 
panics of 1854 and 1857. 
For the foreign born, those in the control group were resident in the United 
States for more years on average during both panics. A longer familiarity with the 
country may have made more informed depositors. The time in the U.S. is higher 
in the later period reflecting the fact that there had been a tidal wave of 
immigrants from Ireland in the late 1840s and early 1850s. In terms of nativity, 
the Irish, a relatively poor group in New York, were the dominant group of 
depositors; and they constituted a higher proportion of the panickers. The 
counties of origin were also given for the Irish immigrants, and they were 
classified according to the four provinces of Ulster, Connacht, Leinster, and 
Munster, roughly the northeast, northwest, southwest, and southeast of the 
country.  The regions of Leinster and Connacht were the poorer regions.   If the 
Irish typically represented the poorest and hence least informed, then we would 
expect that they would be most likely to panic; and this would be most 
pronounced for those from the poorest regions.   In both panics there is some 
evidence of this effect in Table 4.   31
In terms of residence, this summary table shows no easily discernable 
patterns at this relatively high level of aggregation, although the regression 
analysis shows some districts being especially affected by the panic.  By every 
measure of banking activity, those closing their accounts in 1854 were markedly 
different.  They had smaller first deposits, closing balances, total deposits and 
fewer deposits and withdrawals.  However, the variation was very large as seen 
in the standard deviations.  Likewise, the large standard deviations in 1857, do 
not allow us to say that there were distinct differences between accounts closed 
during the panic and others.  
Figures 4 and 5 display the number of accounts closed daily in the panics of 
1854 and 1857.  The six-month windows for each panic show their time 
dimensions, using the accounts closed in the sample described in Table 4.  In 
1854, the dramatic collapse of the Knickerbocker prompted a run on the other 
savings banks, including the EISB, as seen in Figure 4.  However, the continued 
and steady payments to depositors allayed depositor fears and gradually the run 
tapered off and halted.   In 1857, the number of closed accounts jumps up, but 
remains relatively steady though higher until the big run begins on October 10 on 
the Bowery Savings Bank, sparking runs on more savings banks.  The effects on 
the EISB are seen in Figure 5.  Closings were then almost entirely halted by the 
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The key question we wish to investigate is what were the characteristics of 
those depositors who terminated their accounts during the panics compared to 
those who did not.  To analyze the factors affecting the duration of an account, 
we employ a proportional hazard model with an assumed Weibull distribution, as 
the data contains observations with both very short and very long durations and 
there may be some duration dependence (Kiefer, 1988).  Almost all of our 
observations represent completed episodes, as information was recorded as late 
as 1869, resulting in very little right hand censoring.  
 
Figure 4



























































Table 5 presents the estimates for the panicking individuals and the control 
group for 1854 described above in three specifications.  Banking variables were 
important for determining who panicked.  The most highly correlated variables 
are the amount first deposited, the closing balance and the cumulative deposits.  
As this correlation created significant multicollinearity, only the results for the 
cumulative deposits are reported, although very similar results were obtained 
using alternatively, the first deposit and closing balance.  Reflecting wealth and 
banking experience, higher cumulative deposits significantly reduced the hazard 
of closure, indicating that wealthier, more experienced depositors were less likely 
to panic.  The magnitude of the effect was the same for all models for both 
panics. The total number of transactions over the life of the account captured 
Figure 5 





























































account activity and banking experience.
12  This banking experience reduced the 
hazard of closure substantially.  
 Banking variables were added to reflect the behavior of the depositors to the 
payment of dividends—interest on accounts.  Closing an account before 
dividends were paid could have resulted in a loss of the interest. Funds 
deposited before July 1 would earn six months interest by December 31 and 
funds deposited after July 1 but before October 1 would earn three months 
interest by the end of the year.  Dummy variables for opening an account, which 
was usually the largest deposit, after July 1 and after October 1 for 1854 and 
after July for 1857, were included to identify when depositors would not be at risk 
of losing interest.  In Table 5, those who did not stand to lose interest 3 or 6 
months interest had a surprisingly higher probability of closing their accounts in 
the panic.  
The commercial paper rate can be regarded as an indicator of general 
economic or financial stress.  Typically, the rate had high seasonal and cyclical 
component and soared in panics.  As the dividends paid on accounts was fixed, 
a low commercial paper rate could cause funds to flow into the bank and a high 
one could induce funds to depart.  Closures were quite sensitive to the 
commercial paper rate in the month of closure, with higher rates raising the 
hazard of closure.  Gender appears to have played no role as women appeared 
no more likely than men to panic in either panic.  Nor did the number of children 
                                                       
12 Average annual transactions did not capture activity very accurately, as some accounts were 
open very briefly for one deposit and then closed, giving the impression of a high rate of activity.   35
seem to matter.  However, married individuals appear to have been more likely to 
panic, perhaps reflecting extra concern over protection of the family’s nest egg.  
 
Table 5 




























Cum Deposits  0.998 0.000  -4.980  0.000 0.998 0.001  -3.440  0.001 0.999 0.000 -2.760  0.006 
No. of Trans  0.901 0.015  -6.110  0.000 0.874 0.017  -7.070  0.000 0.855 0.018 -7.620  0.000 
July 1854  3.339 0.608  6.620  0.000 3.500 0.668  6.560  0.000 3.599 0.709 6.510  0.000 
October 1854  2.594 0.566  4.370  0.000 3.006 0.685  4.830  0.000 3.397 0.797 5.210  0.000 
CP Rate  1.146 0.012 13.120 0.000 1.137 0.012 11.870 0.000 1.149 0.014 11.500  0.000 
Female  0.999 0.151  -0.010  0.994 0.999 0.157  -0.010  0.995 0.994 0.161 -0.040  0.970 
Married          1.587 0.268  2.740  0.006 1.726 0.295 3.190  0.001 
No. of Children          0.971 0.046  -0.620  0.534 0.929 0.046 -1.510  0.130 
Unskilled          1.120 0.182  0.690  0.488 1.109 0.184 0.620  0.535 
Professional          0.419 0.199  -1.830  0.068 0.445 0.218 -1.660  0.098 
Years in U.S.          0.968 0.015  -2.080  0.038 0.963 0.016 -2.340  0.019 
Irish         2.647  0.622  4.140  0.000       
Ulster               1.585  0.475  1.530  0.125 
Connacht               3.507  1.040  4.230  0.000 
Leinster               3.106  0.879  4.010  0.000 
Munster               4.439  1.162  5.690  0.000 
3C               0.000  0.006  -0.020  0.987 
3D               2.170  1.141  1.470  0.140 
4B               0.895  0.910  -0.110  0.913 
4C               1.216  0.285  0.840  0.403 
4D            1.312  0.318  1.120  0.263 
4E            1.662  0.996  0.850  0.397 
4F            0.000  0.006  -0.020  0.986 
5C            1.086  0.253  0.350  0.723 
5D            1.122  0.331  0.390  0.696 
5E            0.000  0.064  0.000  0.998 
6D            2.199  1.630  1.060  0.288 
                 
P 0.86
1 





No. of Obs  709      657      657      
No of Panickers  218      212      212      
LR Chi-Square  392.1      421.6      453.2      
 
 
The effects of occupation on the hazard of closure are less sharp.  Unskilled 
workers showed no increased proclivity to close or maintain an account in the   36
panic of 1854, but professionals had a lower propensity to panic.   Given the 
difficulty of accurately classifying many jobs, it may not be surprising that the 
unskilled variable is not significant.  
In contrast, the length of residence in the U.S. for the foreign born was 
significant.  The longer a depositor was in the country, the more familiar he or 
she would have been with its customs.  In addition, we know from studies of 
immigrants (Ferrie, 1994) that years in U.S. could be a proxy for income or 
wealth.  Each year of residence lowered the hazard of closure in the panic by 
four percent. 
Nativity was clearly important.   Separating depositors into Irish and non-Irish, 
revealed that the Irish had more than a one and half times higher hazard of 
closure in 1854, reflecting, we hypothesize, higher poverty and lack of human 
capital.  This conjecture appears to be borne out further when dummy variables 
are used for provinces of origin.  All four Irish provinces increase the hazard of 
closure significantly compared to non-Irish, but they vary considerably in effect.  
Their effects are, in fact ordered, in accordance to what we know (Ó Gráda, 
1994) to be the relative income and wealth of the provinces.  Coming from the 
poorest provinces of Connacht and Munster, increased the hazard of closure 
nearly 2 ½  and 3 ½ times, while a depositor from Ulster had a hazard only 59 
percent higher, with weaker significance.    
Lastly, we sought to see if geography played a role, if distance mattered or if 
there were any concentrations of panickers. To identify depositors 
geographically, we used the grid pattern of a contemporary New York City Street   37
and Avenue Guide to group addresses.  Most of the depositors and population 
were concentrated below 14
th Street; and in 1854, 64 percent of depositors we 
examined were in lower Manhattan.  Depositors living in lower Manhattan were 
divided according to the grid from section 3C to 6D, which was assigned a 
dummy variable, leaving the rest of Manhattan and beyond with a zero.   While 
these variables had weak joint significance, there was no indication of increased 
hazard of panicking by individual district.  
In the regressions, there is no strong evidence for duration dependence.  In 
both the more extended specifications, the estimated parameter, p, is 
insignificantly different from one indicating that there was no duration 
dependence. One caveat for these results concerns the composition of the 
control group.   In the control group, 205 depositors closed their accounts before 
the panic of 1854, while another 161 lasted until after the panic but before the 
crisis in 1857.  Eight of these depositors closed in that panic and another 118 
kept their accounts.  If these accounts had special characteristics reflecting their 
longevity, their inclusion might be inappropriate.  However, their exclusion had no 
effect on the results.   
Table 6 reports the three specifications for the Panic of 1857, using the 
accounts closed in the panic and the control group, described in Table 4.  The 
banking variables and the commercial paper rate all affect the probability of 
closure similar to 1854, except that the impact of the July variable is lessened, as  
might be expected, by the smaller potential loss of interest.  Gender, marriage, 
children, and location have similar effects.  However, while being unskilled again   38
had no effect, professionals had a high propensity to panic.   While the 
significance of this variable is low, it is distinctively different from 1854.    The 
nativity factors also appear to be much less important.  Being Irish, coming from 
a particular province or years in the U.S. did not affect the probability of panicking 
in 1857, in marked contrast to 1854. 
 
Table 6 
Survival Analysis of Deposits Accounts 
1857 Sample 
 
























Cum Deposits  0.999 0.000 -2.540  0.011 0.999 0.000  -2.990  0.003 0.999 0.000 -3.100  0.002 
No. of Trans  0.931 0.014 -4.620  0.000 0.904 0.017  -5.470  0.000 0.902 0.017 -5.510  0.000 
July 1857  9.228 1.548 13.250  0.000 10.01
8 
1.897 12.170 0.000  9.925 1.910 11.930 0.000 
CP Rate  1.342 0.021 18.880  0.000 1.325 0.022 16.680 0.000 1.329 0.023 16.490  0.000 
Female  0.954 0.109 -0.410  0.684 1.056 0.148  0.390  0.700 1.044 0.154 0.290  0.769 
Married          1.291 0.216  1.520  0.127 1.334 0.230 1.670  0.095 
No. of Children          0.947 0.042  -1.230  0.217 0.943 0.043 -1.300  0.195 
Unskilled          1.016 0.164  0.100  0.920 1.001 0.167 0.010  0.993 
Professional          1.596 0.489  1.520  0.127 1.635 0.515 1.560  0.118 
Years in U.S.          0.998 0.012  -0.170  0.867 0.994 0.013 -0.440  0.660 
Irish         0.904  0.163  -0.560  0.574       
Ulster              0.785  0.192  -0.990  0.323 
Connacht              0.979  0.232  -0.090  0.928 
Leinster              0.993  0.214  -0.030  0.974 
Munster              0.949  0.192  -0.260  0.796 
3C              0.735  0.757  -0.300  0.765 
3D              0.520  0.313  -1.090  0.278 
4B              0.728  0.524  -0.440  0.659 
4C              1.071  0.227  0.320  0.746 
4D            0.945  0.210  -0.250  0.801 
4E            0.715  0.145  -1.650  0.099 
4F            1.240  0.654  0.410  0.684 
5C            0.914  0.230  -0.360  0.720 
5D            1.016  0.251  0.070  0.948 
5E            0.399  0.407  -0.900  0.367 
6D            1.481  1.069  0.540  0.586 
                 
P 0.565  0.043     1.888 0.089     0.647 0.047    
No. of Obs  733      582      589      
No of Panickers  329      276      276      
LR Chi-Square  1150.
1 
    966.7      973.1      
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Estimated separately, it is difficult to compare the relative effects of the 
variables in 1854 and 1857.  Furthermore, all the contemporary accounts strong 
suggest that there was a time dimension in the panic of 1857, being led by 
business men and the wealthy who closely followed the panics in other cities.  
The New York newspapers were full of information on the situation in 
Philadelphia, where the legislature delayed and labored over the potential terms 
of a suspension of payments (New York Herald, October 9, 1857)  In New York 
City in 1857, the commercial banks, whose clientele was primarily businessmen 
and professionals at this time, were first to be subjected to a run.  The savings 
banks, with their much more diversified depositor base, including many middle 
class and worker class depositors, were first hit some days later.  Moreover, the 
panic hit the commercial banks much harder than savings banks, losing 25 
percent of deposits compared to just over 10 percent.
13   There is reason to 
believe it was not pure contagion. The suspension of the Bowery Bank on 
October 9, threatened the liquidity of the Bowery Savings Bank which had 
$50,000 of its reserves in the commercial bank’s vaults, and a run on the savings 
bank ensued (New York Herald October 11, 1857).  Given the fierce pressure on 
other commercial banks in which savings banks held cash, the run against 
savings banks seems less unreasoned.    
Tables 7 and 8 report estimates of the combined panicking and non-panicking 
depositors for 1854 and 1857 where the panics are treated as the same 
abnormal termination of accounts.  Here, the objective is to search out the  
                                                       
13 Gibbons (1859: 335);  New York Herald, October 1857;  Olmstead (1976).    40
Table 7 
Survival Analysis of Deposits Accounts 
Full Sample for 1854 and 1857 
 








Cum  Deposits  0.999 0.000 -3.150 0.002 
Cum  Deposits  54  1.004 0.002 1.870 0.062 
Cum Deposits Panic Time 54  1.000  0.000  -1.140  0.254 
No. of Trans  0.868  0.016  -7.700  0.000 
No. of Trans 54  0.998  0.071  -0.030  0.972 
No. of Trans Time 54  1.014  0.006  2.430  0.015 
July  1854  6.908 1.395 9.570 0.000 
October  1854  6.453 1.482 8.120 0.000 
July  1857  8.629  1.438 12.930 0.000 
Commercial  Paper  1.295  0.014 23.220 0.000 
Female  1.060 0.110 0.560 0.573 
Married  1.251 0.152 1.840 0.066 
Number of Children  0.958  0.034  -1.230  0.218 
Unskilled  0.878 0.130 -0.880 0.380 
Unskilled  54  1.387 0.724 0.630 0.531 
Unskilled Panic Time 54  1.005  0.034  0.140  0.887 
Professional  0.668 0.205 -1.320 0.188 
Professional  54  0.021 0.054 -1.510 0.131 
Professional  Panic Time 54  1.493  0.296  2.020  0.044 
Years  in  US  1.002 0.012 0.190 0.851 
Years in US 54  1.025  0.054  0.460  0.643 
Years in US Panic Time 54  0.998  0.003  -0.600  0.547 
Irish  0.930 0.155 -0.440 0.663 
Irish 54  18.176  11.677  4.510  0.000 
Irish Panic Time 54  0.961  0.041  -0.930  0.353 
      
      
      
P 1.676  0.053    
No. of Obs  1239     
No of Panickers  495     
LR Chi-Square  1865.7     
 
 
differences in depositor behavior between the panics and any time 
dimensions.   In Table 7, each variable is used, plus an interaction variable to 
identify the effect of that variable for 1854, and an interaction variable of the 
variable times a time trend for the number of days into the panic when the 
account was closed.  In Table 8, similar interaction variables were included for 
1857.  While the cumulative deposits variable was similar in both tables, the   41
results for the total transactions in 1857 suggest that a high number of 
transactions increased the likelihood of panicking in 1857, but this may have 
decreased over the course of the panic.   In 1854, professionals were less likely 
to panic, but their probability of closing their account increased as the panic wore 
on.   The opposite was true in 1857 when being a professional in 1857 increased 
the probability of closing one’s account with the effect declining over the course 
of the panic. Being Irish increased the probability of panicking in 1854, but 
decreased it in 1857.    
These differences between the two years thus provide some evidence for the 
contrasting nature of the two panics.   The more sophisticated and more informed 
depositors were more likely to panic in 1857 than in 1854.  Furthermore, it 
appears that they led the panic.   The poorer and less sophisticated joined in the 
runs, but it may not have been pure contagion given the declining value of their 
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Table 8 
Survival Analysis of Deposits Accounts 
Full Sample for 1854 and 1857 
 








Cum  Deposits  0.998 0.000 -3.770 0.000 
Cum  Deposits  57  1.002 0.001 1.700 0.088 
Cum Deposits Panic Time 57  1.000  0.000  -0.490  0.626 
No. of Trans  0.857  0.015  -8.550  0.000 
No. of Trans 57  1.157  0.061  2.750  0.006 
No. of Trans Time 57  0.995  0.004  -1.240  0.214 
July  1854  6.291 1.195 9.680 0.000 
October  1854  4.146 0.945 6.240 0.000 
July  1857  4.149 0.624 9.450 0.000 
Commercial  Paper  1.155  0.011 14.950 0.000 
Female  0.951 0.097 -0.490 0.624 
Married  1.465 0.169 3.310 0.001 
Number of Children  0.928  0.029  -2.360  0.018 
Unskilled  1.126 0.173 0.780 0.438 
Unskilled  57  1.201 0.566 0.390 0.698 
Unskilled Panic Time 57  0.971  0.035  -0.820  0.414 
Professional  0.277 0.131 -2.710 0.007 
Professional  57  9.853 8.294 2.720 0.007 
Professional  Panic Time 57  0.940  0.057  -1.020  0.308 
Years in US  0.891  0.017  -6.210  0.000 
Years in US 57  1.106  0.038  2.960  0.003 
Years in US Panic Time 57  1.002  0.003  0.650  0.513 
Irish  3.973 0.855 6.410 0.000 
Irish  57  0.324 0.153 -2.390 0.017 
Irish Panic Time 57  0.978  0.036  -0.620  0.536 
      
      
      
P 1.322  0.043    
No. of Obs  1239     
No of Panickers  495     






This paper provides the a detailed microeconomic description of banking 
panics.  What emerges are some features which stand at variance with the 
stylized facts typical of some models of banking panics.   Banking panics were 
not characterized by an immediate mass panic of depositors, and account   43
closings were a modest fraction of all accounts.   Although depositor behavior 
clearly changed quite rapidly, there were time dimensions to the panics.  Account 
closings rise quickly, with distinct jumps in the number per day, often apparently 
influenced by news.   The heterogeneous behavior of depositors allows us to see 
that there were elements of contagion and responses to dramatic news events.   
However, while contagion seems to have been present, it does not appear to be 
strong enough to drive the panic onwards in 1854, the one panic most likely to 
have been driven by pure uninformed contagion.   The panic of 1857 appears 
more likely to have been led by business leaders and banking sophisticates 
followed by less informed depositors.  Uninformed contagion may be present, but 
the evidence suggests that the run on the banks was driven by informational 
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